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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of portable devices (PDAs, smartphones,
digital multimedia players, and so forth) allows mobile users
to carry around a pool of computing, storage and commu-
nication resources. Sharing these resources with other users
(“Digital Organisms” – DOs) opens the door to novel inter-
esting scenarios, where people trade resources to allow the
execution, anytime and anywhere, of applications that re-
quire a mix of capabilities. In this paper we present a fully
distributed approach for resource sharing among multiple
devices owned by different mobile users. Our scheme en-
ables DOs to trade computing/networking facilities through
an auction-based mechanism, without the need of a central
control. We use a set of numerical experiments to com-
pare our approach with an optimal (centralized) allocation
strategy that, given the set of resource demands and offers,
maximizes the number of matches. Results confirm the effec-
tiveness of our approach since it produces a fair allocation of
resources with low computational cost, providing DOs with
the means to form an altruistic digital ecosystem.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed
Systems; H.m [Information Systems]: Miscellaneous
Keywords
Resource Allocation, Optimization, Peer-to-Peer Systems,
Ad-hoc Networks
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile users are evolving: while in the recent past peo-
ple used their mobile devices just for “simple” tasks such as
checking e-mail or browsing the Web, the rise of novel so-
cial applications fosters a massive use of ubiquitous services.
Current Operating Systems for mobile devices (e.g., An-
droid, iOS) allow the execution of applications that, for in-
stance, publish user’s geographical position and other context-
aware information on social networking services. However,
0The publisher version of this paper is available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/Mobilware.2013.16. Please
cite this paper as: Moreno Marzolla, Stefano Fer-
retti, Gabriele D’Angelo. Auction-Based Resource
Allocation in Digital Ecosystems. Proceedings of
the 6th International Conference on MOBILe Wire-
less MiddleWARE, Operating Systems, and Appli-
cations (MobilWare 2013), Bologna (Italy), Novem-
ber, 2013.
these forms of interaction are usually based on the classic
client-server approach, i.e., the mobile device connects to a
central service through its own Internet connection. The
proliferation of heterogeneous devices with different capa-
bilities (computation, communication, data storage, sensors
and actuators) gives rise to new scenarios that promote the
cooperation among individuals in order to guarantee the pro-
vision of “always on” services [6].
As an example, consider a medical doctor who receives an
urgent call while attending a meeting with other colleagues.
He needs to check some medical data to diagnose a particular
illness; unfortunately, the tablet PC he carried with him has
not enough memory and computational power to execute
the job. Therefore, he “rents” CPU power from one of his
colleagues high-end laptop to carry on the analysis.
As another example, consider a user that wants to upload
some pictures made with her smart-phone/camera on Flickr
or on the wall of her social Web application, but she is not
provided with network connectivity. Hence she exploits the
3G mobile connection of a neighboring friend using that as
a gateway to the net via an ad-hoc short range connection
(e.g., Bluetooth).
In general, mobile users have many different devices in
their pockets and suitcase, each of them with specific hard-
ware and software characteristics. Quite often such devices
are not enabled for seamless interaction with other devices
belonging to the same owner; sharing resources among dif-
ferent people is even more challenging. The possibility for a
user to exploit, in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and altruistic way,
computing facilities owned by (known and trusted) neigh-
bors requires mechanisms for automatic service discovery
and negotiation, and for access control.
A system architecture supporting the scenarios above has
been recently proposed [6]. Each mobile user is considered
as a “digital organism” (DO), composed by many differ-
ent devices belonging to the same human being. Each DO
may share resources with peer DOs using auto-configuration
strategies. Then, a community of interacting DOs can be
thought of as a “digital ecosystem”. Each DO in the ecosys-
tem contributes by providing its own unused resources to
its (friend/trusted) neighbors. Therefore, the community of
DOs exploits self-organization protocols and P2P strategies
to create a cooperating, altruistic ecosystem.
Of course, privacy and security issues should be carefully
considered, especially if data are to be distributed to other
users. Addressing these issues in a mobile environment is
highly nontrivial, especially when the remote nodes are com-
pletely untrusted. Therefore, we assume that each DO will
preferably connect to other DOs towards which there is ex-
plicit trust (e.g., because users know each other). For ex-
ample, a user traveling by train shall be willing to share a
network connection with some (known and trusted) travel-
ing companions.
In this paper we address the problem of optimizing the al-
location of resources in a digital ecosystem, by matching re-
source requests and offers. We consider a P2P overlay which
connects DOs; each DO may offer and/or require resources,
which are traded with neighboring DOs. We present a fully
distributed scheme that can match demands and offers, al-
lowing resources to be provisioned efficiently and fairly. We
use a market-based approach in which requests are handled
through ascending clock auctions [1]. We assume that each
DO can use some form of “virtual currency” (tokens) as a
form of payment for resources usage: this allows a fair al-
location that balances supply and demand [15, 21]. First,
we describe a distributed algorithm to carry on the auc-
tion; then, we formulate the resource allocation problem as
a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) optimization problem,
which is used to compute the maximum number of requests
that can be matched. We compare the optimal allocation
with the one provided by our our cheap, local strategy. Re-
sults show that our approach produces good allocations and
requires low computational cost: this makes the auction-
based allocation strategy particularly appropriate for shar-
ing resources among devices with very limited computational
power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we give a precise formulation of the problem we are address-
ing. Section 3 presents our auction-based resource allocation
scheme. In Section 4 we discuss numerical results obtained
from a set of synthetic simulation experiments. In Section 5
we revise the literature and contrast our approach with some
related work. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in
Section 6. Additional details on the auction algorithm, and
the MIP formulation of the optimization problem, are given
in the Appendix.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a set R = {1, . . . , R} of R different resource
types (e.g., network connectivity, processing power, storage,
and so on). N = {1, . . . , N} denotes a set of N users trad-
ing these resources: each user can be either a buyer (if he
requests resources) or a seller (if he offers resources). The
same user may play the role of buyer and seller at the same
time, offering surplus resources while buying those he needs.
For each user i ∈ N, we denote with Reqri the amount of
type r resource requested by i; for each j ∈ N, we denote
with Off rj the amount of type r resource offered by j; quan-
tities are not restricted to be integer. The vectors Req
•i and
Off
•j are called resource bundles
1.
As an example, if there are two resource types (“CPU”and
“Network Bandwidth”), then a resource bundle (0.1 MIPS,
200 KB/s) can be interpreted as a request (or an offer) for
0.1 MIPS of CPU power and 200 KB/s of network band-
width. Unit of measures will be omitted in the following.
We assume that each user (node) is equipped with some
form of wireless connectivity which enables short range in-
1We use the symbol • as a shortcut to denote a slice of a
multi-dimensional vector; therefore, Req
•i denotes the slice
(Req
1i,Req2i, . . . ,ReqRi)
N := {1, . . . , N} set of users
R := {1, . . . , R} set of resource types
Reqri := Amount of resource r requested by user i
Off rj := Amount of resource r offered by user j
RP i := Reserve price of buyer i: maximum amount
i is willing to pay for his requested bundle
SPrj := Unitary selling price of resource r offered by
user j
Mij := 1 iff i can interact with j
Xirj := 1 iff i obtains resource type r from j
Table 1: Notation used in this paper
teraction with a set of neighbors using an ad-hoc network
topology. We model this with an N ×N adjacency matrix
Mij , where users i and j can interact iff Mij = Mji = 1;
matrix Mij is symmetric, so that interactions are always
bidirectional.
Each user can get resources from, or provide resources to,
one of his direct neighbors; multi-hop interactions are not
allowed. Multi-hop interactions would be much harder to
handle, since appropriate routing strategies should be em-
ployed to ensure connectivity in spite of individual users
moving and losing contact with neighbors. We introduce
the binary decision variable Xirj which equals 1 iff user i
obtains resource r from user j. If Xirj = 1, then i must ob-
tain exactly Reqri items of resource r from j. The allocation
Xirj must satisfy the following constraints:
1. Each buyer imust obtain the requested quantitiesReqri
of all resources r in his bundle, or none at all. Partially
fulfilled requests are not allowed.
2. For each r, the requested quantity Reqri must be pro-
vided by a single seller j (if the request is satisfied at
all).
3. For each r, the offered quantityOff rj can be fractioned
across multiple buyers (i.e., a seller is not forced to
provide all items of resource r to a single buyer).
4. If user i gets resource r from j, then the amount re-
quested by i must not exceed the amount offered by j:
Reqri ≤ Off rj .
5. For all r ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
ReqriXirj ≤ Off rj , where the
left-hand side represents the total amount of resource r
provided by seller j. This means that the total amount
of resource r provided by j to all buyers must not ex-
ceed his capacity.
6. Xirj can be 1 only if Mij = 1: interactions are only
allowed between neighbors.
The notation used in this paper is summarized in Table 1
(additional symbols shown in the table will be introduced in
the next section).
The problem of finding an optimal allocation Xirj which
maximizes the number of matched requests (i.e., maximizing
the number of requests which can be satisfied by some seller)
can be formulated as a MIP optimization problem (details
are given in Appendix B). However, solving the optimization
problem is impractical for several reasons: (i) global knowl-
edge of all parameters is required, whereas each peer has
Figure 1: Auction-based resource allocation
only local knowledge; (ii) solving large instances of the opti-
mization problem using general-purpose MIP solvers is time
cosuming; (iii) the optimal allocation may not even be de-
sirable, since the constraints above do not take into account
any measure of fairness between users. The lack of fairness
is a particularly serious limitation, since it gives users no
incentive to share their resources. While it would be possi-
ble to extend the optimization problem to take fairness into
account, the other limitations would still apply.
In the next section we propose a distributed algorithm
for binding resource requests with resource availability; our
algorithm is fully decentralized and uses an economic model
based on ascending auctions; “virtual currency” is used to
compensate transactions and stop free riders.
3. AUCTION-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCA-
TION
We propose a fully distributed algorithm to compute a fair
allocation of the resources offered by sellers. The algorithm
is lightweight and fully decentralized, since it will be exe-
cuted on portable devices (smartphones, PDAs, notebooks)
connected through an ad-hoc network infrastructure.
Our algorithm is based on ascending clock auctions [1];
in this type of auctions, the auctioneer defines the price of
goods, and the bidders reply with the quantities they want
to buy. In case of excess demand, the auctioneer raises the
price and calls for new bids. This mechanism is iterated
until there is no excess demand. Successful bidders pay the
last announced price. In our scenario, each seller engages an
auction with all potential buyers and adjusts the resource
prices independently of other sellers.
Resource allocation works as a sequence of steps, as de-
picted in Figure 1. Each step is divided into three phases.
During the auction phase, all users engage an auction which
consists of multiple rounds; during each round, sellers broad-
cast the unitary prices and quantities of the resources they
offer, and potential buyers place bids. The sellers which re-
ceive excess demand raise the selling price and start a new
round. At the end of the auction, successful buyers pay their
dues to the sellers and can access the provided resources. At
this point, usage is granted for some amount of time, after
which a new step is initiated.
Each user has some amount of virtual currency (tokens),
which can be spent to acquire resources provided by other
peers, or earned by selling access to his resources. In the
following we assume that an adequate scheme exists to em-
ploy virtual concurrency; dealing with the details is out of
the scope of this paper, since several proposals exist such as
those described in [18, 20, 24, 25].
Each node i autonomously computes a slice of the allo-
cation matrix Xirj , i.e., decides from which sellers to buy
the resources in his request bundle. Each seller j broadcasts
the vector Off
•i =
(
Off
1j , . . . ,Off Rj
)
of the amounts of
resources offered, together with the unitary selling prices
SP•j = (SP1j , . . . , SPRj). Each seller can define initial
prices at the beginning of an auction phase; such prices are
called reserve prices, and represent the minimum prices at
which a seller is willing to offer his resources.
Each buyer i can place bids to all sellers j in his neighbor-
hood from which he wants to acquire resources. A bid is a R-
dimensional vector with elements ReqriXirj . Each element
of the bid is a proposal to acquire ReqriXirj items of resource
r from seller j at the unitary price SPrj . Buyer i places a
bid for resource r of j provided that (i) Off rj ≥ Reqri (the
amount requested does not exceed the amount offered), and
(ii) the unitary price SPrj of seller j is the minimum over
all potential sellers. Each buyer i tries to acquire resource r
from the seller providing a sufficient quantity, at the lower
price.
Since there is a finite amount of each resource type, it
is necessary to handle the situation in which the demand
is larger than the supply provided by a seller. We employ
a mechanism based on ascending auctions, which eventu-
ally produces an allocation Xirj satisfying the constraints
described in Section 2.
If all bids placed by i were to be accepted from the sellers,
the total cost for the buyer would be∑
r∈R
∑
j∈N
SPrjReqriXirj
Each buyer i has a maximum reserve price RP i, which rep-
resents the total maximum amount of money he is willing
to spend for the bundle Req
•i
2. Buyer i places bids as long
as the cost (3) is not greater than his reserve price RP i.
Each seller j collects all bids he receives, and replies back
to the buyers with a new vector of (possibly updated) prices(
SP ′1j , . . . ,SP
′
Rj
)
, where:
SP ′rj =
{
SPrj if
∑
i∈N ReqrjXirj ≤ Off rj
SPrj +∆P otherwise
This means that j increases the price by some quantity ∆P
of each resource r for which there is excess demand. Po-
tential buyers who placed bids resulting in excess demands
must either issue a new bid at the new prices, or give up.
The pseudo-code of the seller and buyer algorithms are given
in Appendix A.
Figure 2 shows a simple example with N = 4 nodes and
R = 2 resource types. Nodes 1 and 2 are buyers, and can
interact with sellers {3, 4}, and 4 respectively. The amounts
of resources requested or offered is shown next to each node:
for example, node 1 requests 3 items of resource 1 and 5
items of resource 2.
After the sellers broadcast the offered quantities and sell-
ing prices (in this case, unitary prices are initially set to
1), buyers make their initial bids (Figure 2(a)). Specifically,
user 1 requests 3 items of resource 1 to user 3, and 5 items
of resource 2 to user 4. User 2 requests 2 items of resource
1 and 10 items of resource 2 to user 4. If all bids were
accepted, both nodes 1 and 2 would spend $8.
2Note that the meaning of reserve price is different for buy-
ers and sellers.
Figure 2: Example of resource allocation through
ascending auction
According to the bids above, user 4 has excess demand
on resource 2 since 11 items are requested but only 10 are
available. Therefore, node 4 increases the unitary price of
resource 2 to $2 (we use ∆P = $1); seller 3 has no excess
demand, so he replies with the same unitary prices (Fig-
ure 2(b)).
With the new prices, the bundle requested by user 1 would
cost $3× 1 + $2× 5 = $13 (which is below the reserve price
RP1 = $15), and the requested bundle of user 2 would cost
$14, which is above the reserve price RP2 = $10. Therefore,
user 2 gives up, while user 1 resubmit his bids (Figure 2(c)).
Since there is no excess demands, the auction ends and user
1 can finally acquire his bundle (Figure 2(d)).
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we analyze the performance of the auction-
based resource allocation algorithm using a set of numeri-
cal experiments. We consider different network sizes (with
N = 10, 20, 50 users, respectively) and different numbers of
resource types (R = 3, 5, 7). For each combination of N
and R we perform T = 10 allocation steps. Each step in-
volves the definition of requested and offered bundles (see
below), and running an auction to match them. At the
very beginning, each user is given a budget of 100 tokens;
furthermore, before starting each step several initializations
are performed, as follows.
First, we generate a random network with link density
0.3 (this means that on average, 30% of the elements of the
adjacency matrix Mij are nonzero). 20% of the users are
randomly assigned the role of pure buyers (the offered bun-
dles are set to zero), while the others are pure sellers (the
requested bundles are set to zero). Each user is also assigned
a random demand or offer vector: the number of items of
each resource type that are offered/requested are drawn with
Matches
N R Auction Optimal Auction/Optimal
10 3 14.60 ± 1.48 14.70 ± 1.45 0.99
20 3 46.10 ± 2.33 47.80 ± 2.41 0.96
50 3 162.50 ± 4.55 172.50 ± 3.14 0.94
10 5 10.40 ± 1.07 10.40 ± 1.07 1.00
20 5 33.50 ± 2.93 34.10 ± 3.12 0.98
50 5 149.80 ± 4.44 161.20 ± 2.58 0.93
10 7 6.30 ± 1.64 6.30± 1.64 1.00
20 7 26.40 ± 3.30 27.80 ± 3.50 0.95
50 7 126.80 ± 6.41 141.70 ± 5.38 0.89
Table 2: Number of matches (higher is better).
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Figure 3: Performance results: number of matches
(higher is better)
uniform probability from the discrete set {1, 2, . . . , 10}. The
initial reserve prices for sellers are set to 1, and the price
increment is ∆P = 1. The reserve price for buyer i is set
to ǫi ×
∑
r∈R
Reqri, where ǫi is uniformly chosen in [1.5, 2];∑
r∈R
Reqri is the cost of bundle Req•i when all items have
unitary cost. With the setup above we ensure that each
node has sufficient liquidity to satisfy requests for resources,
since each user will act most of the time as seller. In order
to cope with statistical fluctuations, we executed 20 inde-
pendent replications of each sequence of T steps; at the end
of all replications, average values and confidence intervals at
(1− α) = 0.9 confidence level are computed.
Number of matches. We first analyze the total number of
matches, i.e., the total number of requests which can be
satisfied at the end of the sequence of T allocation steps.
We compare the value obtained using the auction with the
optimal value obtained by matching requests using the MIP
problem on Appendix B; the optimization problem has been
solved using GLPK [16].
Raw results are reported in Table 2. The column labeled
“Auction” shows the total number of matches at the end of
the T auctions, computed with the ascending auction al-
gorithm proposed in this paper. Column labeled “Optimal”
shows the maximum number of matches computed using the
optimization problem. The results has been plotted in Fig-
ure 3): we can see that the number of matches produced
by the auction algorithm is only slightly less than the op-
timum value. It is important to report that for the larger
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Figure 4: Distribution of users budget, after 5 sim-
ulation steps (top) and at the end of the simulation
(bottom); N = 50, R = 7
systems (N = 50, R = 7), GLPK required up to 10s to
compute the optimal allocation (we used GLPK v4.45 on
an AMD Athlon 64 X2 3800+ Dual Core Processor with
4 GB of RAM running Linux 2.6.32). The auction, imple-
mented as a script in GNU Octave 3.2.3 [11], consistently
requires less than a second on the same platform. We recall
that the mechanism works on resource-constrained mobile
devices composing DOs; hence, it is important to reduce as
much as possible the overhead to perform the allocation. In
practice we should expect some slowdown due to request-
response messages sent through wireless links.
We show in Figure 4 rhe distribution of the users budget
after 5 steps, and at the end of a simulation run (10 steps).
Remember that each user is assigned an initial budget of
100 tokens. The budget distribution spreads over a larger
interval as users trade resources, due to the nature of the
experiments carried out. Each user has the same probability
of being a buyer or a seller at each step as any other user.
Behavior on crowded markets. We also investigated the
impact of the connection density (i.e., number of links be-
tween users) on the total number of matches. We consider
N = 50 users and R = 7 resource types, and different val-
ues for the connection density ρ of the ad-hoc network. The
value of ρ is the fraction of nonzero elements of the adja-
cency matrix Mij . We considered ρ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8; for
each value, we executed T = 10 allocation, and each se-
quence was independently repeated 20 times.
The raw data is shown in Table 3. As the connection
density increases, each buyer can interact with more sellers,
since each node has more neighbors. Therefore, we expect
that the total number of matches increases because a buyer
has more chances to find a seller with enough resources to
match his demand.
As we can see from Figure 5, the maximum number of
matches indeed increases as ρ becomes larger. However, the
Matches
Density Auction Optimal Price Max Iter.
0.20 103.40 ± 4.96 113.70 ± 4.14 1.07 6
0.40 141.00 ± 3.98 165.60 ± 3.27 1.15 18
0.60 132.30 ± 3.21 183.60 ± 1.82 1.28 29
0.80 89.60 ± 2.78 190.40 ± 1.57 1.48 56
Table 3: Number of matches for different connection
densities; N = 50, R = 7
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Figure 5: Number of matches for different connec-
tion densities; N = 50, R = 7
total number of matches obtained from the auction has a
maximum at about ρ ∈ [0.4, 0.6], and starts decreasing af-
terwards. The bad behavior of the auction-based alloca-
tion can be explained by the fact that for large values of ρ,
many buyers are likely to share the same neighboring sell-
ers. Therefore, many buyers are likely also to share with
other buyers the seller offering the lowest price: given that
all buyers will bid the best (lowest) price, this will cause
contention to the “best” seller.
To substantiate this claim, we show in Figure 6 the aver-
age price for a single resource item, and the average number
of rounds which are necessary for the auction to settle to
the final prices. We observe that both the average resource
price and the number of rounds increases as the connection
density ρ becomes larger. For ρ = 0.8, about 60 rounds
are requested to conclude the auctions, resulting in higher
unitary prices on average.
Several strategies can be used to mitigate the problem
below: raising the prices by a quantity proportional to the
excess demand or adding randomization in the choice of sell-
ers (such that a buyer may occasionally bid to sub-optimal
sellers) are possible extensions which are currently under
investigation. However, we remark that large connection
densities are somewhat unlikely in the scenario we are con-
sidering, as it would require a large number of people sharing
resources within a limited area. And furthermore, in such
environments short-range communication technologies are
preferred for their transmission power efficiency.
5. RELATED WORKS
The development of interaction mechanisms among wire-
less devices is a well studied area. For instance, the project
“seamless computing” [4] proposed by Microsoft in 2003, and
Jini, which is a part of the Java technology originally devel-
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Figure 6: Average price for any single resource item
(top) and average number of rounds to complete
an auction (bottom) as a function of the connection
density
oped by Sun Microsystems, have addressed issues related to
the definition and implementation of ubiquitous computing
paradigms. Today, the notion of “digital ecosystem” is gen-
erally used to refer to any distributed system with properties
of adaptability, self-organization, scalability and sustainabil-
ity [3]. In this paper, we use this term in a slightly different
acceptation, since we give more emphasis to issues concerned
with mobile networks and interaction among constrained de-
vices [6].
According to our view, there are two kinds of problems
which need to be considered. The first one refers to the dis-
tributed resource utilization. In this sense, several works
related to resource discovery, allocation and organization
(mostly in ad-hoc fashion) are available in the literature,
e.g. [5, 10, 13].
Another main problem is concerned with optimizing the
communication capabilities of a DO. In general, this issue
turns to allow a mobile node, having multiple wireless net-
work interfaces, to change network points of attachment
(handover) without disrupting existing connections, com-
bined with the ability to disseminate messages in multi-hop
transmissions (i.e., communication in a MANET). Examples
of works on seamless host mobility are [2, 9, 17, 23]
As to the use of auctioning systems to allocate discrete
computational resources, works have been already proposed,
but usually employed on different use case scenarios, such
as cluster and classic distributed systems [12, 8, 15, 19, 21].
Other works employ auction-based mechanisms in wireless
networks; however, usually these are schemes that allow
users to dynamically negotiate their agreed service levels
with their service provider [7, 22], to define an optimal chan-
nel allocation or for scheduling. Hence, it is something very
different from the P2P dynamic resource allocation we are
considering in this work. For example, in [14], auction mech-
anisms are proposed to distributively coordinate and deter-
mine which nodes in a wireless network must act as relay
nodes.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a fully distributed algorithm for
resource allocation between DOs. Our algorithm is based on
ascending clock auctions, and allows users to trade resources
in exchange for some form of digital currency. Numerical re-
sults show that this approach represents a viable and effec-
tive strategy promoting sharing of resources, thus providing
DOs with the means to form an altruistic digital ecosystem.
As concerns the general deployment of the proposed scheme
in a real distributed system, there are some open problems
that require further investigation. Security issues are par-
ticularly important: for instance, authentication must be
enforced in order to verify the identity of users that try to
utilize resources of other DOs. We will also consider more
general notations to describe requests for resources, e.g., re-
source bundles as intervals rather than single values.
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APPENDIX
A. AUCTION ALGORITHM
Algorithms 1 and 2 show the behavior of the generic buyer
i and seller j, respectively. We remark that the same user
may act as buyer and seller at the same time, so the al-
gorithms above could also be executed concurrently by the
same node (for clarity, we neglect synchronization issues in
the pseudocode).
Algorithm Buyer(i) requires some additional parameters,
namely the reserve price RP i of user i, and the number of
items of the requested bundle Req
•i. After receiving the
initial price and offered resource amounts from all neighbors
(line 1), the main loop starts. At each iteration, we use
variable p to keep track of the cost of the bid; if p becomes
larger than the reserve price RP i, then i resigns and the
procedure stops (line 14). We use the variable br to denote
the index j of the seller from which i gets resource r. To
place a bid, user i first identifies the set Sr of neighbors
which are offering enough items of resource r (line 6). If Sr
Algorithm 2 Seller(j)
Require: Off
•j Resource bundle offered by j
Require: SP•j Reserve prices of seller j
Require: ∆P price increment
1: Send SP•j ,Off •j to all i ∈ neighbors(j)
2: repeat
3: dr := 0 for all r ∈ R {Demand for resource r}
4: for all bids Reqri received from i do
5: dr := dr + Reqri
6: end for
7: exc := false
8: for all r ∈ R do
9: if (dr > Off rj) then {Excess demand?}
10: SPrj := SPrj +∆P
11: exc := true
12: end if
13: end for
14: Send SP•j ,Off •j to all i ∈ neighbors(j)
15: until (exc = true)
16: Receive Reqri×SPrj tokens and allocate Reqri items of
resource r to buyer i, r ∈ R
is empty, buyer i gives up since we require that all items in
the requested bundle be available. If Sr is not empty, buyer
i will bid for resource r to the seller k ∈ Sr which advertises
the minimum unitary price SPrk for r (line 10). After all
bids are placed, buyer i listens for the new selling prices
SP ′•j from each neighbor j. If the new prices advertised by
sellers to which i placed a bid match the previous prices,
(line 19), the auction is successful; otherwise, a new round
is performed using the updated selling prices.
Algorithm Seller(j) describes the behavior of the generic
seller j. The required input parameters are the initial reserve
prices SPrj (the minimum unitary price at which j is willing
to sell resource r), the offered quantity Reqrj and the price
increment ∆P . First, selling prices SPrj are advertised to
all neighbors (line 1). Then, the main loop starts; we use
the vector dr to keep track of the total demand of resource
r, so that if excess demand for r is detected, its price SPrj
is incremented (line 10). The loop breaks only when there
is no longer excess demand.
B. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section we formulate the problem of computing
the maximum number of requests that can be satisfied as
a MIP optimization problem. The optimization problem is
the following:
Given:
N := {1, . . . , N} Set of users
R := {1, . . . , R} Set of resource types
Reqri := Amount of resource r requested by i
Off rj := Amount of resource r offered by j
Mij := 1 iff user i can interact with user j
Define:
Xirj = 1 iff user i gets resource r from user j
Maximize: ∑
i∈N
∑
r∈R
∑
j∈N
Xirj (1)
Subject to:∑
i∈N
ReqriXirj ≤ Off rj r ∈ R, j ∈ N (2)
∑
j∈N
Xirj ≤ 1 i ∈ N, r ∈ R (3)
∑
j∈N
Xirj =
∑
j∈N
Xi1j i ∈ N, r ∈ R (4)
Xirj ≤Mij i ∈ N, r ∈ R, j ∈ N (5)
The optimization problem above is a MIP problem since
it involves binary decision variables Xirj .
Constraint (2) ensures that the total capacity of each
seller j is not violated: the total amount of type r resource
provided by j to all other users must not exceed its ca-
pacity Off rj . Constraint (3) requires that each user i ac-
quires resource type r from at most a single provider j;
note that i may be unable to acquire any resource at all,
so the constraint is an inequality rather than an equality.
Constraint (4) requires that, for each user i, either all the
resources it needs are obtained, or none at all. Finally, con-
straint (5) requires that user i can request resources from
user j (Xirj = 1) only if i and j are neighbors (Mij = 1).
From constraint (4) we have that∑
r∈R
∑
j∈N
Xirj = 0 or R, for all i ∈ N
therefore, the total number of matches, i.e., the total number
of buyers which can be satisfied, is∑
i∈N
∑
r∈R
∑
j∈N
Xirj
R
(6)
Since R is a constant, each assignment of Xirj maximiz-
ing (6) also maximizes the somewhat simpler expression (1)
which we use as objective function.
